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The	  Problem	  of	  the	  P3:	  Public-­‐Private	  Partnerships	  in	  National	  
Cyber	  Security	  Strategies	  
Abstract	  
	  
Cyber	   security	   is	   an	   emerging	   -­‐-­‐	   and	   increasingly	   high	   profile	   -­‐-­‐	   national	  
policy	  concern;	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  material	  vulnerabilities	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  
of	   conceptualising	   security	   approaches.	   Many	   states,	   particularly	   Western	  
democracies,	   have	   situated	   the	   `public-­‐private	   partnership'	   (P3)	   at	   the	  
centre	  of	  their	  national	  cyber	  security	  strategies.	  However,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  
persistent	  ambiguity	  around	  this	  fundamental	  concept:	  policymakers	  regard	  
the	  state	  as	  without	  the	  capability	  and	  also	  without	  the	  mandate	  to	  impose	  
security	   requirements	   beyond	   government-­‐owned	   systems;	   the	   private	  
sector,	   however,	   is	   highly	   averse	   to	   accepting	   responsibility	   for	   national	  
security	   and	   will	   fund	   cyber	   security	   only	   within	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	  
profit/risk	   calculation	   appropriate	   for	   a	   shareholder-­‐based	   arrangement.	  
Amidst	   increasing	  suggestions	  that	  a	  market-­‐led	  approach	  to	  cyber	  security	  
has	   failed,	   a	   deeper	   exploration	   at	   the	   ideas	   and	   concepts	   behind	   this	  
approach	   finds	   that	   a	   reliance	   on	   the	   P3	   emerges	   from	   deeply	   held	   and	  
shared	  beliefs	  about	  government	  legitimacy	  and	  private	  authority	  which	  may	  





Cyber	  security	   is	  emerging	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  challenging	  aspects	  of	  the	   information	  
age	   for	   policymakers,	   technologists	   and	   scholars	   of	   international	   relations.	   It	   has	  
implications	   for	   national	   security,	   the	   economy,	   human	   rights,	   civil	   liberties	   and	  
international	  legal	  frameworks.	  Although	  politicians	  have	  been	  aware	  of	  the	  threats	  of	  
cyber	   insecurity	   since	   the	   early	   years	   of	   Internet	   technology	   [1],	   anxiety	   about	   the	  
difficulties	  in	  resolving	  or	  addressing	  them	  has	  increased	  rather	  than	  abated	  [2,	  3,	  4].	  
In	  response,	  governments	  have	  begun	  to	  develop	  national	  cyber	  security	  strategies	  to	  
outline	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  intend	  to	  address	  cyber	  insecurity.	  In	  many	  states	  where	  
critical	   infrastructure	   such	   as	   utilities,	   financial	   systems	   and	   transport	   have	   been	  
privatised,	   these	   policies	   are	   heavily	   reliant	   upon	  what	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   `public-­‐
private	  partnership'	  as	  a	  key	  mechanism	  through	  which	  to	  mitigate	  the	  threat.	   In	  the	  
UK	   and	   US,	   the	   public-­‐private	   partnership	   has	   repeatedly	   been	   referred	   to	   as	   the	  
`cornerstone'	  or	  `hub'	  of	  cyber	  security	  strategy	  [1,	  5,	  6].	  
While	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	  have	  often	  been	  developed	  as	  an	  appropriate	  means	  
to	  address	  both	  non-­‐traditional	  and	  traditional	  security	  threats	  [7,	  8],	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
cyber	  security	  this	  arrangement	   is	  uniquely	  problematic.	  There	  has	  been	  a	  persistent	  
ambiguity	  with	   regard	   to	   any	   clear	   and	   agreed	   parameters	   for	   the	   partnership.	   The	  
reticence	   of	   politicians	   to	   claim	   authority	   for	   the	   state	   to	   legislate	   tougher	   cyber	  
security	   measures	   coupled	   with	   the	   private	   sector's	   aversion	   to	   accepting	  
responsibility	   or	   liability	   for	   national	   security	   leaves	   the	   `partnership'	   without	   clear	  
lines	   of	   responsibility	   or	   accountability.	   Questions	   are	   now	   being	   raised	   about	   the	  
efficacy	   of	   a	   market-­‐driven	   approach	   to	   cyber	   security,	   although	   any	   alternative	   in	  
liberal	  democratic	   states	  has	  yet	   to	  emerge	   [2].	  Crucially,	  questions	  arise	  here	  about	  
the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   state	   can	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   abdicating	   not	   just	   authority	   but	  
responsibility	   for	   national	   security.	   As	   Dunn	   Cavelty	   and	   Suter	   [9]	   point	   out,	  
`generating	  security	  for	  citizens	  is	  a	  core	  task	  of	  the	  state;	  therefore	  it	  is	  an	  extremely	  
delicate	   matter	   for	   the	   government	   to	   pass	   on	   its	   responsibility	   in	   this	   area	   to	   the	  
private	  sector'.	  	  Essentially,	  this	  raises	  questions	  about	  how	  well	  the	  state	  is	  equipped	  
to	   provide	   national	   security	   in	   this	   context	   and	   about	   how	   existing	   policies	   and	  
practices	  of	  national	  security	  are	  being	  challenged	  by	  this	  new	  threat	  conception.	  
This	   paper	   develops	   a	   comprehensive	   understanding	   of	   how	   policymakers	   and	   the	  
private	   sector	   are	   conceptualising	   their	   respective	   roles	   in	   national	   cyber	   security,	  
where	   there	  may	   be	   disparity	   in	   these	   conceptions	   and	   what	   implications	   this	   may	  
have	  for	  national	  and	  international	  cyber	  security.	  The	  paper	  moves	  onto	  the	  analysis	  
of	  the	  public-­‐private	  partnership	  from	  the	  perspectives	  of	  both	  partners.	  It	  should	  be	  
noted	   here	   that	   there	   is	   a	   round	   of	   interviews	   yet	   to	   be	   completed	   for	   this	   project	  
which	  will	  contribute	  further	  to	  the	  analysis;	  what	  is	  presented	  here	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  
secondary	  research,	  with	  some	  discussion	  of	  the	  underpinning	  conceptual	  framework.	  








2 Analysis	  of	  the	  Public-­‐Private	  Partnership	  in	  Cyber	  
Security	  
	  
There	   are	   several	   reasons	   why	   cyber	   security,	   particularly	   in	   the	   context	   of	   critical	  
infrastructure	  protection,	  has	  been	  conceived	  of	  as	  some	  kind	  of	  collaborative	  project	  
for	   the	  public	   and	  private	   sectors.	   The	   state	   is	  understood	   to	  be	   responsible	   for	   the	  
provision	  of	   security,	   especially	   national	   security.	   Critical	   infrastructure,	   those	   assets	  
and	   systems	  necessary	   for	   the	  preservation	  of	   national	   security	   (broadly	   defined),	   is	  
perceived	   as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   providing	   security	   to	   the	   state	   [10].	   The	   potential	  
implications	  of	  a	  large-­‐scale	  cyber	  attack	  on	  critical	  infrastructure	  are	  so	  extensive	  that	  
it	   follows	   naturally	   that	   the	   government	   would	   recognise	   some	   authority	   and	  
responsibility	  here.	  However,	  because	  most	  of	  the	  critical	  infrastructure	  in	  both	  the	  UK	  
and	  US	   is	  privately	  owned	  and	  operated,	  by	  definition	   there	  has	   to	  be	   some	  kind	  of	  
relationship	  between	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  provision	  of	  security	  
in	  this	  context.	  
The	  public-­‐private	  partnership	   is	  not	  of	  course,	  unique	   to	  cyber	  security.	   It	  has	  been	  
employed	  widely	  by	  states	  like	  the	  UK	  and	  US	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  range	  of	  
other	   issues	   including	   security	   related	   ones.	   The	   practice	   intensified	   from	   the	   1990s	  
when	   the	   privatisation	   of	   critical	   infrastructure	   was	   regarded	   as	   economically	  
beneficial	  to	  the	  state,	  freeing	  up	  capital	  and	  relying	  more	  heavily	  on	  the	  efficiencies	  
and	  business	  practices	  of	   the	  private	   sector.	  There	   is	  an	  extensive	  body	  of	   literature	  
that	   has	   developed	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   this	   shift	   that	   examines	   the	   public-­‐private	  
partnership	  in	  all	  kinds	  of	  contexts	  [11,	  12,	  13].	  It	  deals	  with	  the	  background	  of	  these	  
partnerships,	  the	  range	  of	  different	  approaches,	  how	  to	  measure	  success	  and	  failure,	  
and	   how	   responsibility	   and	   authority	   are	   delegated.	   There	   has	   also	   been	   some	  
examination	  of	  the	  public-­‐private	  partnership	  in	  cyber	  security,	  most	  notably	  by	  Dunn	  
Cavelty	   and	   Suter	   [9],	   but	   this	   focuses	   on	   ways	   to	   improve	   it	   rather	   than	   critically	  
analysing	   the	   political	   implications	   of	   it.	   Combined,	   this	   literature	   provides	   a	   solid	  
foundation	   in	   highlighting	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   this	   partnership	   is	   distinct	   but	   also	   by	  
outlining	   common	   assumptions	   and	   expectations	   that	   run	   through	   public-­‐private	  
partnerships	  more	  generally.	  
2.1 What	  is	  this	  public-­‐private	  partnership?	  
It	   is	   necessary	   to	   be	   clear	   about	   what	   exactly	   is	   meant	   by	   the	   term	   public-­‐private	  
partnership	  in	  this	  particular	  context.	  Perhaps	  not	  unexpectedly,	  there	  is	  a	  huge	  range	  
of	   diverse	   arrangements	   that	   are	   referred	   to	   as	   public-­‐private	   partnerships,	   ranging	  








from	   the	   joint	   provision	   of	   services	   with	   some	   government	   regulatory	   oversight	  
(health	   sectors),	   to	   closely	   contracted	   outsourcing	   of	   large	   infrastructure	   projects,	  
(building	   roads	   and	   bridges,	   the	   Olympics,	   etc).	   Much	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   public-­‐
private	   partnerships	   revolves	   around	   identifying	   and	   classifying	   partnership	  
arrangements.	   This	   often	   takes	   place	   within	   a	   framework	   of	   authority	   and	  
responsibility	   -­‐-­‐	   key	   concepts	   for	   this	   study.	   In	   examining	   these	   relationships,	  
Wettenhall	   [14]	   identifies	   two	   broad	   categories:	   (a)	   horizontal,	   non-­‐hierarchical	  
arrangements	   characterised	   by	   consensual	   decision-­‐making	   and	   (b)	   hierarchically	  
organised	  relationships	  with	  one	  party	  in	  a	  controlling	  role.	  The	  implication	  being,	  he	  
argues,	  that	  true	  `partnerships'	  are	  of	  type	  (a)	  and	  not	  type	  (b).	  
This	   distinction	   has	   implications	   for	   the	   public-­‐private	   partnership	   in	   cyber	   security.	  
National	   cyber	   security	   strategies	   avoid	   suggestions	   of	   hierarchy	  when	   they	   refer	   to	  
the	  public-­‐private	  partnership.	  The	  language	  is	  deliberately	  cooperative	  and	  implies	  a	  
shared	  purpose	  and	  shared	   interests.	  The	  UK	  Cyber	  Security	  Strategy	  [15]	  states	  that	  
achieving	  the	  goal	  of	  a	  safe,	  secure	  Internet	  will	  `require	  everybody,	  the	  private	  sector,	  
individuals	  and	  government	   to	  work	   together.	   Just	  as	  we	  all	  benefit	   from	   the	  use	  of	  
cyberspace,	  so	  we	  all	  have	  a	  responsibility	  to	  help	  protect	   it'.	  With	  specific	  reference	  
to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  private	  sector,	  it	  states	  that	  there	  is	  an	  expectation	  that	  the	  private	  
sector	  will	   `work	   in	  partnerships	  with	  each	  other;	  Government	  and	   law	  enforcement	  
agencies,	  sharing	  information	  and	  resources,	  to	  transform	  the	  response	  to	  a	  common	  
challenge,	   and	   actively	   deter	   the	   threats	   we	   face	   in	   cyberspace'	   [16].	   	   This	   non-­‐
hierarchical	   language	   belies	   the	   poor	   alignment	   of	   perceptions	   about	   the	   `common	  
challenge'	  and	  the	  `threats	  we	  face	  in	  cyberspace'	  [17].	  It	  assumes	  that	  those	  are	  the	  
same	  for	   the	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  when	   in	   fact,	   they	  are	  not.	  The	  private	  sector	  
regards	   cyber	   security	   challenges	   as	   financial	   and	   reputational	   -­‐-­‐	   not	   as	   a	   common	  
public	   good	   (i.e.	   whose	   benefits	   accrue	   to	   the	   community	   at	   large)	   which	   is	   how	  
governments	  regard	  national	  cyber	  security.	  
On	  a	  more	  granular	  level,	  Linder	  [18]	  identifies	  six	  distinctive	  uses	  of	  the	  term	  P3	  and	  
links	  them	  to	  neo-­‐liberal	  or	  neo-­‐conservative	  ideological	  perspectives.	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  
draws	  out	   questions	   about	   their	   intended	  purpose	   and	   significance	   as	  well	   as	   `what	  
the	   relevant	   problems	   are	   to	   be	   solved	   and	   how	   best	   to	   solve	   them'.	   Two	   of	   these	  
`types'	   can	   shed	   light	   on	   what	   is	   meant	   by	   the	   public-­‐private	   partnership	   in	   cyber	  
security;	  partnership	  as	  management	  reform	  and	  partnership	  as	  power	  sharing.	  
Linder	  argues	  that	  partnership	  as	  management	  reform	  refers	  to	  the	  expectation	  that	  
government	   managers	   will	   learn	   `by	   emulating	   their	   partners'	   and	   shift	   their	   focus	  
from	   administrative	   processes	   to	   deal	   making	   and	   attracting	   capital	   in	   a	   more	  








entrepreneurial	   and	   flexible	   approach.	   Significantly,	   this	   is	   regarded	   as	   one	   of	   the	  
objectives	   of	   the	   partnership	   because	   of	   the	   belief	   that	   the	   market	   is	   inherently	  
superior	   and	   `its	   competitive	   character	   stimulates	   innovation	   and	   creative	   problem	  
solving'	  -­‐-­‐	  a	  view	  embedded	  in	  neo-­‐liberalism	  [18].	  Perhaps	  not	  surprisingly,	  although	  
this	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  strategies	  of	  both	  states,	  it	  is	  much	  more	  pronounced	  in	  the	  US	  
policies.	  
The	   [George	   W.]	   Bush	   Administration's	   National	   Strategy	   to	   Secure	   Cyberspace	   [5]	  
argued	   that	   in	   the	  US	   “traditions	  of	   federalism	  and	   limited	   government	   require	   that	  
organizations	   outside	   the	   federal	   government	   take	   the	   lead”	   in	   cyber	   security.	   	   This	  
interpretation	   of	   the	   government's	   limited	   authority	   is	   combined	   here	   with	   an	  
assumption	  of	  its	  limited	  capability.	  “The	  federal	  government	  could	  not	  -­‐-­‐	  and,	  indeed,	  
should	   not	   -­‐-­‐	   secure	   the	   computer	   networks	   of	   privately	   owned	   banks,	   energy	  
companies,	  transportation	  firms,	  and	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  private	  sector”.	  This	   is	  based	  
on	   the	  belief	   that	   “in	   general,	   the	  private	   sector	   is	   best	   equipped	   and	   structured	   to	  
respond	   to	   an	   evolving	   cyber	   threat”	   and,	   at	   a	   US	   Congressional	   hearing	   in	   2000,	  
Deputy	   Attorney	   General	   Eric	   Holder's	   statement	   that	   decision	   makers	   in	   the	   US	  
“believe	   strongly	   that	   the	   private	   sector	   should	   take	   the	   lead	   in	   protecting	   private	  
computer	  networks.”	  [19].	  In	  testimony	  before	  a	  hearing	  on	  Internet	  security,	  the	  FBI's	  
Michael	  Vatis	  argued	  that	  cyber	  security	  is	  “clearly	  the	  role	  of	  the	  private	  sector.	  The	  
Government	   has	   neither	   the	   responsibility	   nor	   the	   expertise	   to	   act	   as	   the	   private	  
sector's	  system	  administration.”	  [20]	  
So	  there	  is	  a	  rejection	  here	  of	  government	  liability	  for	  private	  networks	  that	  is	  framed	  
in	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  government	  has	  neither	  the	  authority	  nor	  the	  capability	  to	  deal	  
with	  cyber	  security.	  It	  is	  an	  approach	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  partnership	  as	  management	  
reform	   type	   identified	   by	   Linder	   -­‐-­‐	   though	   the	   government	   rejects	   the	   objective	   of	  
change	   inherent	  within	   that	   type.	  Rather,	   it	  promotes	   two	   `truths'	  about	   the	  private	  
sector.	  First,	  they	  must	  take	  responsibility	  and	  liability	  for	  their	  own	  network	  security	  
and	  second,	  their	  superior	  capacity	  for	  flexibility	  and	   innovation	  means	  that	  they	  are	  
best	  placed	  take	  the	  lead	  on	  this	  particular	  security	  problem.	  The	  problem	  of	  course,	  is	  
that	  these	  networks	  are	  central	  to	  national	  security	  and	  therein	  lies	  the	  problem	  from	  
the	  perspective	  of	  the	  private	  sector.	  
The	  private	  sector	  develops	  security	  strategy	  within	  a	  very	  different	  framework	  to	  that	  
of	   the	   government's	   `public	   good'	   conception.	   For	   the	   private	   operators	   of	   critical	  
infrastructure,	   decisions	   are	   made	   within	   a	   business	   model	   that	   responds	   to	   profit	  
margins	   and	  maximising	   shareholder	   interests.	   This	   is	   largely	   incompatible	   with	   the	  
promotion	   of	   a	   `public	   good'	   (especially	   in	   wider	   context	   of	  Keeping	   the	   UK	   safe	   in	  








cyber	   space	   [21])	   The	   private	   sector	   raises	   two	  main	   objections	   to	   the	   role	   that	   the	  
government	  perceives	  for	  them	  in	  the	  cyber	  security	  strategies;	  first,	  they	  argue	  that	  
the	  expense	  of	  ensuring	  cyber	  security	  to	  a	  national	  security	  level	  would	  be	  significant	  
and	   second,	   that	   the	   litigious	   nature	   of	   (especially	   US)	   society	   means	   that	   industry	  
would	   be	   very	   resistant	   to	   accepting	   liability	   for	   the	   security	   of	   their	   products	   or	  
systems	  [22].	  
Stiglitz	  and	  Wallsten	  [23]	  make	  some	  important	  observations	  about	  this	  dichotomised	  
approach	   to	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   in	   the	   context	   of	   technology	   innovation.	  
`Theory	   predicts'	   they	   argue,	   `and	   many	   empirical	   studies	   confirm,	   that	   profit-­‐
maximising	  firms	  invest	  less	  than	  the	  socially	  optimal	  level	  of	  [technology	  research	  and	  
development]'.	  What	   is	   in	  society's	  best	   interest	  with	  regard	  to	  cyber	  security,	   is	  not	  
always	   in	   the	  best	   interests	   of	   the	  private	   sector.	   This	   is	   because,	   they	   argue,	   social	  
benefits	  do	  not	   translate	   in	   terms	  of	  private	  profitability	   -­‐-­‐	   no	  matter	  how	  desirable	  
the	  outcome.	  
So	   private	   sector	   owners	   of	   critical	   infrastructure	   accept	   responsibility	   for	   securing	  
their	  systems	  -­‐-­‐	  to	  that	  point	  that	  it	  is	  profitable.	  That	  is,	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  dealing	  with	  
an	  outage	  promises	  to	  cost	  more	  than	  prevention	  [4,	  24].	  However,	  they	  tend	  to	  make	  
a	   distinction	   between	   protecting	   against	   the	   low-­‐level	   threat	   such	   as	   “background	  
noise,	  individual	  hackers,	  and	  possibly	  hacktivists”	  and	  protecting	  against	  an	  attack	  on	  
the	  state	   (national	  security).	   In	   testimony	  at	  a	  US	  hearing	  on	  privately	  owned	  critical	  
infrastructure	   cyber	   security,	   one	  witness	   explained	   that	   “it	   is	   industry's	   contention	  
that	   government	   should	   protect	   against	   the	   larger	   threats	   -­‐-­‐	   organized	   crime,	  
terrorists,	   and	   nation-­‐state	   threats	   -­‐-­‐	   either	   through	   law-­‐enforcement	   or	   national	  
defense.”	   [25].	   This	   was	   particularly	   pertinent	   in	   the	   fallout	   surrounding	   the	   Sony	  
Pictures	  hacking	   in	   late	  20141,	  even	  though	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	   it	  was	  the	  
act	  of	  a	  malicious	  nation-­‐state.	  
This	   disjunction	   in	   perceptions	   is	   arguably	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   tension	   in	   this	  
`partnership'.	  Typically,	  the	  rationale	  articulated	  in	  the	  literature	  for	  partnering	  is	  that	  
neither	  partner	  on	  its	  own	  can	  achieve	  their	  desired	  objectives.	  They	  must	  either	  need	  
each	   other	   or	   there	   must	   be	   a	   financial	   arrangement	   that	   makes	   the	   partnership	  
attractive.	  This,	  we	  can	  observe	  most	  readily	  in	  the	  single	  most	  emphasised	  practice	  in	  
this	  partnership	  -­‐-­‐	  information	  sharing.	  And	  information	  sharing	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  
the	  second	  of	  Linder's	   `types'	  of	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	   -­‐-­‐	  partnerships	  as	  power	  
sharing.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-­‐arts-­‐30512032	  	  








Linder	  writes	  that	  partnerships	  as	  power	  sharing	  are	  based	  on	  an	  ethos	  of	  cooperation	  
where	   `trust	   replaces	   the	   adversarial	   relations	   endemic	   to	   command-­‐and-­‐control	  
regulation'	   and	   in	   which	   there	   is	   some	  mutually	   beneficial	   sharing	   of	   responsibility,	  
knowledge,	  or	  risk.	  In	  most	  instances,	  he	  writes,	  `each	  party	  brings	  something	  of	  value	  
to	   the	   others	   to	   be	   invested	   or	   exchanges'.	   Finally,	   `there	   is	   an	   expectation	   of	   give-­‐
and-­‐take	  between	  the	  partners,	  negotiating	  differences	  that	  were	  otherwise	  litigated.'	  
[18].	   The	   previous	   section	   explains	   how	   rather	   than	   shared	   responsibility,	   this	  
partnership	  is	  characterised	  by	  disputed	  responsibility.	  Sharing	  knowledge,	  however,	  is	  
certainly	   regarded	  by	  both	  partners	  as	   integral	   to	   this	   relationship	  and	  building	   trust	  
and	   collaboration	   is	   a	   dominant	   theme	   running	   through	   not	   only	   the	   strategy	  
documents	  but	  also	  the	  responses	  from	  the	  private	  sector.	  
2.2 The	  practice	  of	  information	  sharing	  as	  a	  partnership	  
There	  can	  be	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  main	  form	  of	  cooperation	  within	  the	  public-­‐private	  
partnership	   is	   found	   in	  the	  shared	  emphasis	  on	   information	  sharing	  [9].	   In	  July	  2010,	  
the	   US	   Government	   Accountability	   Office	   published	   a	   report	   entitled	   Critical	  
Infrastructure	   Protection:	   Key	   Private	   and	   Public	   Cyber	   Expectations	   Need	   to	   Be	  
Consistently	  Addressed	   [26].	   The	  purpose	  of	   the	   study	  was	   to	   clarify	   the	  partnership	  
expectations	   of	   both	   the	   public	   and	   private	   sectors	   and	   to	   determine	   the	   extent	   to	  
which	   those	   expectations	  were	   being	  met.	   The	   study	  was	   limited	   to	   five	   key	   critical	  
infrastructure	  sectors	  deemed	  to	  be	  most	  reliant	  on	  cyber	  security:	  communications,	  
defence	  industrial	  base,	  energy,	  banking	  and	  finance,	  and	  information	  technology.	  
The	  provision	  of	  timely	  and	  actionable	  cyber	  threat	  and	  alert	  information	  emerges	  as	  a	  
key	  expectation	  of	   the	  partnership	   from	  both	   the	  public	   and	   the	  private	   sectors	  but	  
there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  obstacles	  to	  sharing	   information	  from	  both	  perspectives.	   	  The	  
private	   sector	   reports	   that	   it	   is	   not	   always	   easy	   to	   immediately	   distinguish	   between	  
some	  kind	  of	  technical	  problem,	  a	  low-­‐level	  attack	  and	  a	  large-­‐scale	  sustainable	  attack.	  	  
In	   addition,	   it	   sometimes	   runs	   counter	   to	   their	   commercial	   interests	   to	   report	  
vulnerabilities.	   Finally,	   for	   private	   security	   firms,	   sharing	   information	   with	   the	  
government	  about	  attacks,	  could	  lead	  to	  it	  being	  shared	  with	  their	  competitors.	  Their	  
business	  model	   is	  reliant	  on	  obtaining,	  holding	  and	  selling	   information,	  not	  sharing	   it	  
[26].	  
The	   public	   sector	   also	   encounters	   limitations	   to	   sharing	   information.	   Classified	  
contextual	   information	  cannot	  be	  shared	  with	   individuals	  who	  do	  not	  have	  adequate	  
security	   clearances.	   Even	   those	   working	   in	   the	   private	   sector	   who	   do	   have	   security	  
clearance	  can	  often	  do	  nothing	  with	  classified	  information	  because	  to	  take	  action	  on	  it	  
would	  expose	  it.	  In	  addition,	  there	  is	  a	  high	  expectation	  that	  threat	  information	  shared	  








from	  the	  public	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  will	  be	  accurate	  and	  this	   leads	  to	  extensive	  and	  
stringent	   review	   and	   revision	   processes	   that	   also	   delay	   the	   release	   of	   time	   critical	  
information	  [26].	  	  This	  problem	  of	  sharing	  information	  has	  persistently	  been	  regarded	  
as	   a	   key	   impediment	   to	   cyber	   security	   and	   in	   testimony	   before	   a	   US	   Congressional	  
hearing	  on	  cyber	  security	  in	  2011,	  a	  senior	  official	  highlighted	  this	  as	  one	  of	  two	  main	  
areas	  that	  needed	   improvement	  [27].	  However,	   the	  UK	  Government	  have	  attempted	  
to	   address	   this	   issue	  with	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   Centre	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   National	  
Infrastructure 2 ,	   which	   aims	   to	   protect	   national	   security	   by	   providing	   protective	  
security	   advice	   (particularly	   cyber	   security/information	   assurance),	   as	  well	   as	   CESG3,	  
the	   UK's	   national	   technical	   authority	   for	   information	   assurance,	   which	   protects	   the	  
vital	   interests	  of	   the	  UK	  by	  providing	  advice	  and	  guidance	  to	   the	  UK	  Government	  on	  
the	  security	  of	  communications	  and	  electronic	  data,	   in	  partnership	  with	   industry	  and	  
academia.	   In	   March	   2013,	   the	   UK	   Government	   launched	   the	   Cyber	   Security	  
Information	  Sharing	  Partnership	   (CiSP)4,	  a	   joint	  government	  and	   industry	   initiative	   to	  
share	  cyber	  threat	  and	  vulnerability	  information	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  overall	  situational	  
awareness	  of	  the	  cyber	  threat	  and	  therefore	  reduce	  the	  impact	  on	  UK	  business.	  These	  
initiatives	   are	   overseen	   by	   the	  Office	   of	   Cyber	   Security	   and	   Information	   Assurance5,	  
which	  provides	  strategic	  direction	  and	  coordinates	  the	  cyber	  security	  programme	  for	  
the	   government,	   enhancing	   cyber	   security	   and	   information	   assurance	   in	   the	   UK.	  
Cabinet	  Office	  Minister	  responsible	  for	  the	  Cyber	  Security	  Strategy,	  Francis	  Maude	  MP	  
said	  at	  the	  launch	  of	  CiSP~\cite{caboff:2013}:	  
“This	   innovative	   partnership	   is	   breaking	   new	   ground	   through	   a	   truly	  
collaborative	  partnership	  for	  sharing	  information	  on	  threats	  and	  to	  protect	  UK	  
interests	   in	   cyberspace.	   The	   initiative	  meets	   a	   key	   aim	   of	   our	   Cyber	   Security	  
Strategy	  to	  make	  the	  UK	  one	  of	  the	  safest	  places	  to	  do	  business	  in	  cyberspace.	  
As	   part	   of	   our	   investment	   in	   a	   transformative	   National	   Cyber	   Security	  
Programme;	   we	   are	   pleased	   to	   provide	   a	   trusted	   platform	   to	   facilitate	   this	  
project.”	  
Howard	   Schmidt,	   former	   White	   House	   Cyber	   Security	   Adviser,	   welcomed	   the	   CiSP	  
announcement,	  saying:	  














“In	   the	  US,	  we	  have	   seen	   the	   emphasis	   that	   President	  Obama	  has	  placed	  on	  
cyber	   security	   and	   in	   particular	   steps	   to	   protect	   our	   critical	   infrastructure.	  
Many	   senior	   leaders	   in	   private	   sector	   companies	   are	   supporting	   it	   and	  
recognizing	  it	  is	  not	  only	  a	  security	  issue	  but	  a	  business	  imperative.	  The	  launch	  
of	  the	  UK	  CISP	  is	  an	  important	  step	  in	  forging	  an	  ongoing	  partnership	  between	  
industry	   and	   government,	   promoting	   information	   sharing	   by	   providing	   the	  
ability	   to	   analyze	   and	   redistribute	   information	   in	   a	   timely,	   actionable	   and	  
relevant	  manner.”	  
2.3 Key	  objectives	  and	  markers	  of	  success	  
By	   the	   late	   1990s,	   the	   critical	   literature	   looking	   at	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   was	  
maturing	  and	  there	  was	  a	  realisation	  that	  evaluating	  these	  arrangements	  was	  complex	  
and	   under-­‐researched.	   Essentially,	   there	   was	   little	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   what	   the	  
success/failure	   rate	   of	   these	   arrangements	  was.	   In	   fact,	   there	  was	   not	   really	   even	   a	  
conceptual	  framework	  for	  doing	  so.	  In	  1999,	  American	  Behavioral	  Scientist	  published	  a	  
special	   issue	  dedicated	   to	   these	  questions.	   In	   the	   introduction,	  Rosenau	   summarises	  
[29]	   many	   of	   the	   journal	   arguments	   when	   she	   writes	   that	   `in	   general,	   partnering	  
success	   is	  more	  likely	   if	  (a)	  key	  decisions	  are	  made	  at	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  a	  project	  
and	   set	   out	   in	   a	   concrete	   plan,	   (b)	   clear	   lines	   of	   responsibility	   are	   indicated,	   (c)	  
achievable	   goals	   are	   set	   down,	   (d)	   incentives	   for	   partners	   are	   established,	   and	   (e)	  
progress	   is	   monitored'.	   She	   also	   identifies	   a	   set	   of	   criteria	   for	   the	  measurement	   of	  
success	  -­‐-­‐	  some	  of	  which	  are	  useful	  in	  considering	  this	  case,	  particularly	  accountability	  
and	  possible	  conflicts	  of	  interest.	  
In	  terms	  of	  conflict	  of	  interest,	  she	  makes	  the	  case	  that	  partnerships	  do	  not	  (as	  many	  
assume)	   necessarily	   reduce	   regulation.	   If	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   private	   sector	   are	  
misaligned	   with	   normative	   goals	   like	   care	   for	   the	   vulnerable	   (for	   example,	   old	   age	  
homes)	  then	  the	  government	  must	  monitor	  and	  regulate	  to	  ensure	  the	  profit	  motive	  
does	  not	   supersede	   the	   intended	  delivery	  of	   service	   [29].	  Here	  we	  see	   the	  profile	  of	  
one	  of	  the	  central	  problems	  of	  this	  public-­‐private	  partnership;	  the	  expectation	  that	  the	  
private	   sector	  will	   invest	   in	   cyber	   security	   beyond	   their	   cost/benefit	   analysis	   to	   fully	  
accommodate	   the	   public	   interest	   -­‐-­‐	   in	   other	   words,	   to	   ensure	   national	   security.	  
Because	   market	   incentives	   are	   not	   adequate	   to	   promote	   this	   level	   of	   security,	  
oversight	   and	   some	   level	   of	   regulation	   are	   necessary.	   A	   2013	   US	   Government	  
Accountability	   Office	   report	   [30]	   found	   that	   many	   of	   the	   experts	   they	   consulted	  
argued	  that	   the	  private	  sector	  had	  not	  done	  enough	  to	  protect	  critical	   infrastructure	  
against	   cyber	   threats.	   The	   private	   sector	   explanation	   for	   not	   fully	   engaging	   in	   the	  
government's	   cyber	   security	   strategy	  was	   that	   the	  government	  had	   failed	   to	  make	  a	  








convincing	   business	   case	   that	   mitigating	   threats	   warranted	   substantial	   new	  
investment.	   	   Dunn	   Cavelty	   and	   Suter	   argue	   that	   while	   public	   private	   cooperation	   is	  
necessary,	   the	   way	   it	   is	   organised	   and	   conceptualised	   needs	   to	   be	   rethought.	   They	  
propose	  to	  do	  so	  through	  governance	  theory	  and	  they	  find	  that	  `CIP	  policy	  should	  be	  
based	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  on	  self-­‐regulating	  and	  self-­‐organising	  networks'.	  By	  this,	  they	  
mean	   that	   `...the	   government's	   role	   no	   longer	   consists	   of	   close	   supervision	   and	  
immediate	   control,	   but	   of	   coordinating	   networks	   and	   selecting	   instruments	   that	   can	  
be	  used	  to	  motivate	  these	  networks	  for	  CIP	  tasks.'	  [9].	  This	  may	  provide	  some	  forward	  
momentum	   though	   Rosenau	  makes	   the	   point	   here	   that	   a	   public-­‐private	   partnership	  
cannot	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  success	  if	  it	  `results	  in	  lower	  quality	  of	  public	  policy	  services,	  
the	   need	   for	   more	   government	   oversight,	   and	   the	   need	   for	   expensive	   monitoring,	  
even	  if	  it	  appears	  to	  reduce	  costs'.	  Perhaps	  more	  problematically	  for	  Dunn	  Cavelty	  and	  
Suter's	  recommendation	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  accountability.	  
On	   accountability,	   Rosenau	   writes	   that	   because	   these	   partnerships	   often	   see	   policy	  
decisions	   and	   practices	   that	   are	   normally	   reserved	   for	   elected	   officials	   delegated	   to	  
the	   private	   sector,	   accountability	   is	   essential	   to	   maintaining	   a	   healthy	   democratic	  
order.	  If	  responsibility	  and	  accountability	  can	  be	  devolved	  to	  private	  actors,	  the	  central	  
principle	   that	   political	   leaders	   and	   governments	   are	   held	   to	   account	   is	   undermined	  
[29].	   	   For	   many	   scholars,	   to	   ensure	   effective	   accountability	   in	   a	   public-­‐private	  
partnership,	  the	  specifics	  of	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  must	  be	  made	  clear	  at	  the	  outset	  
and	  goals	  must	  be	  clearly	  articulated.	   	   In	  addition,	  Stiglitz	  and	  Wallsten	   [23]	  observe	  
that	   in	   doing	   so,	   it	   becomes	   clear	   when	   additional	   incentives	   and	   resources	   are	  
necessary	  to	  achieve	  agreed	  goals	  and	  these	  must	  be	  provided	  if	  accountability	  is	  to	  be	  
sustained.	  	  In	  cases	  such	  as	  cyber	  security,	  in	  which	  the	  public	  good	  is	  the	  end	  goal	  for	  
government,	  as	  with	   the	  alignment	  of	   interests	  discussed	  above,	  accountability	  does	  
not	   appear	   to	   emerge	   from	  market	   forces	   alone,	   nor	   is	   it	   a	   trivial	   undertaking	   [31].	  	  
This	   is	   not	   to	   suggest	   that	   public-­‐private	   partnerships	   cannot	   be	   successful	   when	  
interests	  and	  objectives	  diverge,	  but	  in	  the	  view	  of	  Stiglitz	  and	  Wallsten,	  in	  these	  cases	  
`more	  attention	  needs	  to	  be	  placed	  on	  the	  incentive-­‐accountability	  structure'	  [23].	  
The	  2010	  US	  GAO	  report	   [26]	   referred	   to	  previously	   is	  also	  useful	   for	   the	  analysis	  of	  
key	  objectives	  of	  this	  partnership	  and	  for	  measuring	  its	  success.	  	  The	  report	  found	  that	  
in	   addition	   to	   information	   sharing,	   there	   were	   two	   main	   expectations	   that	   the	  
government	  holds	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  this	  partnership.	  First,	  it	  was	  expected	  that	  
they	   would	   commit	   to	   execute	   plans	   and	   recommendations	   such	   as	   best	   practices.	  
This	  is	  important	  because	  it	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  government	  shifting	  responsibility	  to	  
the	   private	   sector	   in	   the	   understanding	   that	   if	   the	   private	   sector	   responds,	   then	  
regulation	  can	  be	  avoided.	  The	  study	  reported	  that	  four	  of	  the	  five	  sectors	  examined	  








were	  meeting	  government	  expectations	  to	  a	  `great/moderate'	  degree.	  The	  exception	  
was	   the	   IT	   sector	   which	   was	   reported	   as	   demonstrating	   `little/no'	   commitment	   to	  
execute	  plans	  and	  recommendations	  such	  as	  best	  practice.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  IT	  sector	  meets	  
only	  one	  out	  of	  ten	  services	  expected	  by	  the	  government	  to	  a	  `great/moderate'	  degree	  
–	   technical	   expertise.	  On	   all	   other	   criteria,	   this	   sector	   ranked	   at	   `some'	   or	   `little/no'	  
[26].	  Given	  the	  reliance	  of	  the	  other	  sectors	  on	  the	  IT	  sector,	  this	  deficit	  is	  particularly	  
concerning	  and	  to	  some	  degree,	  has	  to	  undermine	  the	  others'	  compliance.	  
The	   second	   key	   expectation	   (apart	   from	   information	   sharing)	   identified	   in	   the	   GAO	  
report	   is	   that	   the	   private	   sector	   will	   provide	   appropriate	   staff	   and	   resources.	   Only	  
banking/finance	   and	   commerce	   were	   reported	   to	   be	   meeting	   this	   expectation	   to	   a	  
`great/moderate'	  degree	  with	  defence	  industrial	  base,	  energy	  and	  IT	  all	  being	  ranked	  
at	   `some'.	  There	   is	   clearly	  a	   significant	   skills	   gap	  and	   lack	  of	  qualified	  workers	   in	   the	  
UK,	  although	  there	  have	  been	  wholesale	  changes	  to	  the	  school	  Computing	  curriculum	  
in	  England	  [32]	  from	  ages	  5-­‐16	  (along	  with	  reform	  in	  Scotland	  and	  changes	  anticipated	  
in	  Wales)	  to	  address	  broader	  digital	  and	  computational	  skills.	  There	  have	  also	  been	  a	  
range	   of	   UK	   policy	   announcements	   specifically	   addressing	   cyber	   security	   education	  
alongside	   the	   curriculum	   changes,	   all	   the	   way	   from	   funding	   initiatives	   to	   improve	  
baseline	  digital	  competencies	  (e.g.	  Get	  Safe	  Online6),	  to	  national	  learning	  programmes	  
and	   competitions	   (e.g.	   Cyber	   Security	   Challenge	   UK 7 )	   and	   the	   accreditation	   of	  
appropriate	   Master's	   degrees	   by	   GCHQ	   [33].	   It	   remains	   to	   be	   seen	   how	   successful	  
these	  initiatives	  will	  be	  in	  raising	  the	  profile	  of	  cyber	  security	  skills	  and	  careers,	  as	  well	  




At	  this	  stage,	  prior	  to	  the	  fieldwork	  interviews,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  draw	  some	  preliminary	  
conclusions.	   First,	   and	   somewhat	   surprisingly	   given	   its	   centrality	   in	   successive	   cyber	  
security	   policies,	   exactly	   what	   this	   `partnership'	   entails	   has	   always	   been	   unclear.	  	  
Unpacking	   it	  has	  revealed	  that	  there	  are	   inherent	  tensions	  and	  misaligned	  objectives	  
that	  are	  not	  in	  keeping	  with	  expectations	  of	  public-­‐private	  partnership	  arrangements.	  
The	   partnership	   is	   consistently	   referred	   to	   in	   strategy	   documents	   using	   normative,	  
value	   based	   language	   rather	   than	   clear	   statements	   outlining	   legal	   authority,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  http://www.getsafeonline.org	  
7	  http://cybersecuritychallenge.org.uk/education	  








responsibility	  and	  rights.	  Although	  politicians	  subscribe	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  there	  exists	  
(or	  should	  exist)	  a	  deeply	  entrenched	  norm	  of	  cooperation	  between	  the	  government	  
and	   private	   sector	   this	   appears	   not	   to	   be	   the	   case.	   Rather,	   the	   private	   sector	   has	  
consistently	  expressed	  an	  aversion	  to	  accepting	  responsibility	  for	  national	  security	  and	  
regard	   cyber	   security	   within	   a	   cost/benefit	   framework	   rather	   than	   a	   `public	   good'	  
framework.	   This	   is	   particularly	   pertinent	   given	   the	   high-­‐profile	   announcements	   in	  
January	   2015	   of	   increased	   US-­‐UK	   cyber	   security	   cooperation	   [34],	   especially	   in	  
strengthening	  cooperation	  on	  cyber	  defence,	  supporting	  academic	  research	  on	  cyber	  
security	  and	  improving	  critical	  infrastructure	  cyber	  security.	  
The	   second	   conclusion	   to	   arise	   from	   this	   study	   is	   that	   we	   are	   witnessing	   a	   unique	  
approach	   to	   `out-­‐sourcing'	   national	   security	   that	   has	   implications	   for	   conceptions	   of	  
governance,	  state	  power,	  global	  security	  and	  international	  partnerships	  and	  resource	  
sharing.	   States	  with	   greater	   government	   control	   over	   critical	   infrastructure	   and	   also	  
over	   their	   information	   infrastructure	   potentially	   have	   a	   significant	   advantage	   in	   that	  
they	   are	   able	   to	   control	   and	   shape	   their	   response	   to	   cyber	   insecurity	   with	   greater	  
autonomy	  and	  agency.	  However,	  there	  are	  potentially	  profound	  consequences	  for	  civil	  
liberties:	  monitoring,	  data	  retention,	  the	  use	  of	  encryption	  and	  more	  broadly	  what	  we	  
mean	  by	   `digital	   rights'.	  This	   is	  of	  particular	   relevance	   to	  emerging	  UK	  cyber	  security	  
strategy	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  considered	  more	  thoroughly	   from	  a	  research,	  policymaking	  
and	  national	  infrastructure	  perspective.	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